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Turkish television has undergone a distinctive transformation since the early 2000s in 
which new regulations, rapid market growth, and political pressures have interacted with 
and transformed each other. As Turkey set new records in 2013 for the highest number 
of journalists arrested worldwide, television dramas have suffered from their fair share 
of political pressures, while the contemporary political agenda has, in turn, infiltrated the 
content of television dramas. This article analyzes the ways in which Turkish television 
dramas appear as a sphere of political contest. 
 




This article focuses on the transformation of television dramas in Turkey within a highly 
politicized media environment, one highlighted by the direct and indirect intervention of politicians and the 
exploitation of such interventions by high-profile media professionals. The politicization of dramas can be 
taken as an umbrella term encompassing several dimensions of the intersection between politics and 
television, in which particular nexuses can be identified.  
 
First, television dramas have been well exploited by nation-states in building their national 
identities by defining ideal citizenship or mobilizing national sentiments in countries such as India 
(Mankekar, 1999; Rajagopal, 2001), Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 2005), China (Rofel, 2002), Brazil (Porto, 2011; 
Tufte, 2000), and so on. Yoshimi (2003) states that the flow of television reconstructed national memory 
and identity in Japan during the 1960s by defining morning, midday and evening time slots in which 
domestic memories were related to the national history through soap operas and dramas in particular.  
The role played by public broadcasting in constructing national identities may seem banal. On the other 
hand, the intertwined interests of governments and private broadcasting companies pave the way for 
redefining the nation’s boundaries via television shows. Porto (2011) demonstrates the extent to which 
                                                 
Kumru Berfin Emre Cetin: berfinemre@gmail.com 
Date submitted: 2014–02–11 
 
1 I would like to thank my friend Derrick Wright for his guidance and efforts in editing and proofreading 
this article. I would also like to thank my colleagues in Hacettepe University, Faculty of Communication for 
their comments. 
International Journal of Communication 8(2014)  Turkish Television Dramas  2463 
Brazilian telenovelas echo the hegemonic political discourses of the periods in which they were produced 
thanks to TVGlobo’s support for the government.  
 
Second, the nexus can be highlighted in television dramas depicting social issues. According to 
Salamandra (2010), Syrian dramas provide particular social and political depictions framed by “the demise 
of socialism, the perceived failures of nationalism, and the rise of Islamism” (p. 1). Arab-language 
dramas, musalsals, usually raise social issues such as “corruption, the role of religion and extremism in 
society or the status of women,” sometimes “pushing things too far” and annoying officials (Dick, 2005, 
para. 10). Studies of Brazilian primetime entertainment reveal that these programs have “delved into 
controversial topics such as racism, homosexuality, abortion, anti-smoking, drug abuse, and the health 
care infrastructure, as well as specific diseases such as HIV/AIDS, leukemia, and breast cancer” (La 
Pastina, 2004, p. 302). In a similar vein, Tufte (2000) argues that “Brazilian telenovelas reflect the 
extreme polarization in Brazilian social reality” (p. 98) as there is always a class dimension in their 
diegesis and, as such, are not dissimilar to British soaps that tend to deal with mundane issues in terms of 
class and region (Geraghty, 2002). A recent study addresses the British community drama EastEnders as 
a source of counterhegemonic nostalgia toward public services and “a cultural expression of a social 
democratic worldview” (Lamuedra & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 1). That is to say, dramas that touch upon social 
issues or locate characters’ personal dilemmas within a broader social context eventually provide 
particular political frameworks for their viewers.  
 
A more explicit appearance of this nexus can be identified in political dramas that usually portray 
professional politicians Political dramas can be regarded as a subgenre, especially on U.S. and UK 
television, with particular conventions that assemble discourses about politics as a game of power, 
although the representations vary. These dramas usually represent politicians in a negative light when 
their ambitions override the common good they are supposed to represent. Both La Pastina (2004) and 
Coleman (2008) emphasize that politics are illustrated in Brazilian telenovelas and British soaps as games 
of power, complicated by the intertwined interests of politicians and the elites.  
 
In relation to Turkish TV dramas, I use the term politicization in two ways: first, to correspond to 
a recent trend in which television dramas have begun to deal with contemporary political issues, some 
aiming to convey particular political messages to the audience, while others stand out as political 
manifestations and, second, to address the ways in which television dramas have become a battleground 
for groups expressing a variety of political concerns. In Turkey, I argue, the politicization of television 
dramas is a novel phenomenon, indicative of a broader transformation of the media market and political 
institutions in Turkey during the last decade, a transformation which initially presumed a relatively isolated 
media environment with predefined structures of regulation and control.  
 
Until 1990 the Turkish television market was dominated by the monopoly of the public 
broadcasting company, TRT (Turkish Radio Television Institution). The following 10 years saw the birth 
and collapse of media conglomerates with growing investments in television production and 
advertisement. The expansion of the production market since the early 2000s, which implied a growing 
audience interest, re-addressed television dramas not only as profitable commodities, but also as 
significant fields of political contest over meaning. This period was also characterized by the handover of 
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hegemony from the Kemalist elites to the neoliberal conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi, or JDP) government (Tugal, 2009), which pursued a decisive political agenda in 
regulating media content. These changing market conditions for television production, characterized by 
intense competition, required a particular ability to respond quickly to the demands of the various 
constituents, such as the audience, channel executives, and politicians. In a similar vein, Lopez (2001) 
explains how TVGlobo’s competition with its then-counterpart, TVTupi, provided Brazilian telenovelas with 
a national character, as it acknowledged the military regime’s attempts to rebuild the national identity. 
That is to say, political context along with the political economy of the media can shape the politics of 
television dramas.  
 
I therefore use the term politicization of dramas to correspond to a transformation process in 
Turkish television, characterized by the expansion of the television production market, political challenges 
to the freedom of the press, and the eventual penetration of political content into dramas. In this article, I 
specifically employ this term to reveal a responsive process in which dramas take sides in an overtly 
politicized media environment, while at the same time politicians and governmental institutions intervene 
in drama production. Although this period may seem peculiar to Turkish television history, one can identify 
several similarities to Egyptian and Syrian musalsals and Brazilian telenovelas (Hamburger, 2000; Porto, 
2005, 2009) in terms of the politicization process. 
 
The Crisis of Press Freedom 
 
Turkish public broadcasting enjoyed a long-term monopoly over the country’s television market 
until the late 1980s when the first private television channel, Magic Box, was launched, benefitting from 
the unregulated media market of the period. For many years private television channels exploited the 
deregulated media environment in several respects including occupying bands of their own, paying neither 
fees nor taxes, deciding the advertisement durations and slots, and constructing the television content 
with no intervention from any regulating institution. In this regard, private broadcasting enjoyed a free 
market in the literal sense of the term. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo, Televizyon Ust 
Kurulu) was established in 1994 to regulate radio and television broadcasting in Turkey through an 
“autonomous and unbiased public corporation,” but even though the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTSC) was assigned the duty of planning and allocating the channel frequencies among private 
broadcasters, it did not fulfill this function until 2006 (Adaklı, 2006). The private broadcasting market in 
the late 1990s was characterized by oligopolization and horizontal and vertical monopolization (Adaklı, 
2006). Channel allocations to private enterprises long remained unregulated, causing de facto illegal radio 
and television broadcasting to occur for more than 15 years (Kejanlioglu, 2004).  
 
The Turkish television market rapidly expanded during the 2000s, transforming the economy and 
the content of television dramas in various ways (Emre Cetin, in press). The market’s value reached one 
billion Turkish lira ($6.6 million) by 2008, although it had declined to 700 million ($4.4 million) in 2010 
(ISMMMO, 2010). The growth of the television market primarily led to a programming dependence on 
dramas, with 66% of television broadcasting in 2010 being allocated to dramas by the five popular private 
channels (Sozeri & Guney, 2011). As with the telenovelas of Latin American and Spanish-language 
television (Lopez, 2002), dramas became the sine qua non for Turkish television. The content of television 
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dramas also saw a significant transformation during the post-2000 period, with long running times 
(around 90 minutes, excluding the advertising slots), thematic diversification, generic hybridity, and 
repetition (Emre Cetin, 2013). The expansion of the production market was also facilitated by the 
exportation of dramas to nearby countries, and Turkish dramas have been consumed in a wide region that 
encompasses the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and North Africa. Recent research on the 
perception of Turkey in the Middle East shows that Turkish dramas are followed by 82% of the viewing 
public in Iraq and by 55% Syria (Akgun & Gundogar, 2013).  
 
The Turkish media market experienced a dramatic change after the government of the JDP came 
to power in 2002. According to Sumer and Adaklı (2010, p. 1): “In the history of Turkish politics, no 
government has ever been this directly involved in how the media operates.” Nevertheless, rather than 
being a sudden move that could be observed immediately after the JDP came to power, the government’s 
intervention in the media gradually increased, peaking at critical periods such as the Constitutional 
Referendum and the Gezi Park Protests. Cayli and Depeli (2012) highlight how the legal changes to the 
Penal Code and the Press Code during 2002–2007 were effective in this respect, and the physical attacks 
and threats against journalists along with various legal cases dramatically increased after 2007. In 2011 
Turkey ranked 148 out of 179 countries in the Reporters Without Borders’ Freedom of Press Index. Along 
with the Penal and Press codes, the government also took advantage of tax penalties to control and 
punish media conglomerates whose publications did not echo government discourses. The Dogan Media 
Group, one of the largest media conglomerates, was fined more than $1 billion, the most expensive tax 
penalty in Turkish history. According to Dogan Tilic, chair of the Association of European Journalists, 
although the company had some tax issues, the penalty must be regarded as a consequence of the 
tension between the government and the media group (Onderoglu, 2009).  
 
One could argue that the JDP government secured its hegemony after the Constitutional 
Referendum in 2010,2 which the government also considered to be a representation of its support by 
various social groups, enabling the government to pursue an authoritarian approach, reinforcing the 
aggressive attitudes held against the media and journalists by these different parties. Consequently, many 
media professionals (particularly journalists and editors) were dismissed or forced to resign immediately 
after the Referendum. Danzikyan (2012) notes that silencing journalists has been routine since 2011, with 
such cases being discussed on websites and independent media for a couple of days before being 
forgotten until the next case emerges. Kurban and Sozeri (2012) and Cayli and Depeli (2012) highlight the 
increasing number of journalists who have been dismissed or forced to resign since 2011. This aggression 
against journalists and media workers (including actors playing in popular television series) peaked during 
and after the 2013 Gezi Park protests; therefore, this is the period on which we focus.  
 
                                                 
2 September 12, 2010: The date has a symbolic resonance as it coincides with the 30th anniversary of the 
coup. The referendum was held to amend 26 articles of the 1982 Constitution prepared under the military 
regime. The amendment to the 15th article was of particular importance as it ended the legal immunity of 
the generals and enabled the initiation of judicial proceedings. More than 70% voters turned out, 57% of 
whom voted “yes.”  
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May 28, 2013 saw the commencement of a month-long series of demonstrations in Turkey. These 
protests were aimed at protecting Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Taksim Square against urban transformation 
policies which would demolish the park and construct in its place a historic military barracks and shopping 
mall. Demonstrations swiftly spread across the country and became antigovernment protests formed by 
groups encompassing Kemalists, Turkish nationalists, Kurds, conservatives, leftists, feminists, LGBTI 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex) movement, football fans, anticapitalist Muslims, and others. 
Many protestors were fatally injured due to the inappropriate use of tear gas, and police violence caused 
several deaths, while a policeman died falling from a bridge during the protests. Television channels 
overwhelmingly turned a blind eye to the protests for several days, and leading news channels such as 
NTV and CNNTURK were widely criticized by audiences, who accused the owners and executives of siding 
with the government (Bulut, 2013). The Union of Turkish Journalists declared that 59 journalists were 
either dismissed or forced to resign during the Gezi Park Protests (Akgul, 2013). Many celebrities and 
television personalities took part in the protest and explicitly supported it including Halit Ergenc, the actor 
playing Sultan Suleiman in the popular series Magnificent Century (Muhtesem Yuzyil, 2011–2014), who 
attended negotiations with the Prime Minister during the protests. The government launched a 
counterattack by inviting Necati Sasmaz (who plays the media icon Polat Alemdar, the protagonist of the 
remarkably popular series Valley of the Wolves).  
 
In this highly polarized media environment, the popular serial Leyla and Mecnun (Leyla ile 
Mecnun, 2011–2013) was cancelled by the public television channel TRT on the basis of low ratings and 
high production costs. This came as a surprise as Leyla and Mecnun had been ranked among the 
International Movie Database (IMDB) top 50 and had been on air for three seasons. Eventually, one of the 
actors, Ahmet Mumtaz Taylan, revealed that a video clip by the actors, shot three months prior to the 
protests that showed them criticizing the Gezi Park demolition, had annoyed the public channel’s 
executives. Terminating the serial led to wide protests on Twitter with the hashtag #Leyla ile Mecnun’a 
Cevap Ver TRT (Reply to Leyla and Mecnun TRT). The drama’s cast and crew were transferred to another 
television channel with a new drama, I Missed Too (Ben de Özledim, 2013–2014), but in response to high 
audience curiosity about the finale of Leyla and Mecnun, a character in I Missed Too explained the serial’s 
finale to other characters, enabling the audience to reconnect with Leyla and Mecnun after its sudden 
disruption. One television serial was thereby finalized orally within another in a form of reinforced 
intertextuality, due to increased political tension and censorship. That is to say, political pressures led 
producers to find creative strategies to deal with this silencing and, in doing so, intensified the interaction 
between audience and producers in a form of solidarity against censorship. In this regard, one could argue 
that television dramas gained a political function (along with an entertainment one) in the post–2000 
period.  
 
Novel Discovery: The Significance of Entertainment Politics 
 
As well as the explicit and implicit forms of governmental media control, growth of the television 
market and exportation opportunities led to a kind of reinvention of the significance of the popular as a 
political arena as well as an economic one. One example is the family. 
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The conservative values constructed around television families, which depict various family crises 
in Turkish television dramas, could be described as banal. Families are usually located within a particular 
neighborhood where they are surrounded by the conservative norms and values of neighborhood 
communities. The neighborhood norms and values are mainly defined by surveillance and control. In 
Turkish neighborhood dramas, like the Syrian musalsals such as Damascene Days (Salamandra, 2005) 
and Bab al-Hara, “[t]he hara, the old city neighborhood, appears a utopia of social integration and mutual 
assistance, where disputes are settled amicably, and class differences barely ruffle the surface” 
(Salamandra, 2010, p. 3). The expansion of conservatism toward other subgenres such as detective 
fiction, absurd comedy, and so on can be observed through the increasing promotion of marriage and the 
family in these dramas. However, while this is of interest, I focus on more explicit types of politicization 
which redefine television dramas as a form of political contest and reconsider the role of entertainment in 
the construction of political ideas and in encouraging viewers to take sides. 
 
One can identify various forms of politicization in Turkish dramas, all of which are compatible with 
the government’s political agenda, which envisaged the restructuring of the state and invited various 
conservative Islamist sects and groups to become shareholders in the process of the restructuring. 
However, politicizing television dramas should not be regarded as a top-down process manipulated by 
powerful political elites. Rather, it consists of complexities of power and exchange among politicians, 
media professionals, editors, and owners as well as contingent acts and situations. As a consequence, the 
politicization of dramas can be followed via particular patterns rather than through systematic 
propagandizing. Elsewhere, I distinguished four trends in the politicization of television dramas: (1) 
dealing with contemporary political issues, (2) settling accounts with the past, (3) neo-Ottomanism, and 
(4) piety and the Islamic worldview (Emre Cetin, 2013). These trends predominantly correspond to 
particular political agendas or projects, to a certain extent the zeitgeist of the period. In the following 
sections, I discuss the ways in which television dramas cluster around certain political topics, either 
provoking political tensions or contributing to reconciliation. 
 
Dealing with Contemporary Political Issues 
 
Valley of the Wolves (Kurtlar Vadisi, 2003–2005) can be regarded as the predecessor in the 
politicization of television dramas, which boldly and deliberately sought to confront contemporary political 
debates.3 Furthermore, the serial kept itself up-to-date by continually referring to and/or re-narrating the 
political agenda of the time (such as Turkey’s negotiations with the European Union, the Cyprus question, 
the Kurdish question, etc.). Remarkably, the now-deceased president of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktas 
himself acted in the serial, in a discussion with the protagonist, Polat Alemdar, criticizing the hypocrisy of 
the international public with regard to the recognition of Northern Cyprus.4 The latter version of the serial 
Valley of the Wolves: Terror (2007) divided the public into pro– and anti–Valley of the Wolves groups with 
its trailer, which revealed that the serial would deal with the Kurdish question from a nationalist 
                                                 
3 Coleman (2008, p. 206), in his analysis of British soap operas, classifies this dimension of politics as 
“issue politics” in the sense that it deals with “issues from real-world political agenda.” 
4 For the infiltration of real political personalities or political issues into television dramas, see Coleman, 
2008; Griffiths, 2001; Hamburger, 2000; La Pastina, 2004. 
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perspective. Other spinoffs, such as the films Valley of the Wolves: Iraq (2006) and Valley of the Wolves: 
Palestine (2011),5 received controversial responses from the international public due to the overdose of 
anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism contained in them (see Figure 1 for the spin-off Valley of the Wolves: 
Ambush, 2007–). Clearly then, the politicization of television dramas has different transnational 






Figure 1. Polat Alemdar and his companion Abdulhey raid the Israel consulate in 





                                                 
5 Valley of the Wolves: Iraq broke the box office records of its time, with more than 4 million spectators, 
whereas Valley of Wolves: Palestine was seen by more than 2 million people in Turkey. 
6 Dick (2005) points out that U.S. officials asked that the Qatar production Road to Kabul (2004), which 
narrates the story of Afghan and Arab mujahids, be cancelled. Officials were concerned that the series 
could encourage recruitment to Islamic groups. Misrepresentation of Jewish characters in other Egyptian 
or Syrian dramas such as Faris bi-la Jawad (2002) and Al Shatat (2003) has annoyed the United States 
and Israel in the past (Dick, 2005), and tense diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria were caused 
by the drama Ukhwat al-Turab, which dealt with Armenian genocide (Salamandra, 2005). 
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Valley of the Wolves narrates contemporary political issues such as the Kurdish question and the 
legitimacy of paramilitary organizations, providing a fictional perspective, while continually referring to 
real events and personalities in order to attract audience interest. This novel approach triggered a 
politicizing trend. Although not long running, Code Name (Kod Adi, 2006) and Deaf Room (Sagir Oda, 
2006–2007) focused on the intelligence activities of the state and on the organization and employment of 
paramilitary groups. One Turkey (Tek Turkiye, 2007–2011), Sakarya Firat (2009–2013), and Sefkat Hill 
(Sefkat Tepe, 2010–) featured soldier-heroes fighting against Kurdish guerrillas in defense of Turkey, 
stopping plots for an independent Kurdistan, thus depicting the Kurdish question from a militarist 
perspective. It is important to note that One Turkey and Sefkat Hill were broadcast on the Islamist 
channel, Samanyolu, and the popularity of these programs contributed a great deal to mainstreaming 
these television channels.  
 
On the other hand, these examples indicate the power of nationalist discourses which dominate 
Islamist channels, a fact usually disregarded in the shadow of their Islamist orientation. Recently, the 
trailer for Red Apple (Kizil Elma), which portrays the activities of the National Intelligence Service showed 
the protagonist taking an oath to protect the nation and the state on the Turkish flag, the Koran, and a 
gun. Interestingly, three dramas which follow this trend (Valley of the Wolves, Sakarya Firat, and Red 
Apple) were produced by Osman Sinav, who was formerly associated with Turkish nationalism. The explicit 
political discourses, which were previously specific to Turkish news or talk shows, penetrated fictional 
programs, as the dramas of this type indicate. 
 
Settling Accounts with the Past 
 
Turkish democracy has witnessed several military interventions since 1960. The JDP government, 
members of which suffered from the military memorandum of 1997 (that is, the document written by 
military leaders aimed at threatening and intervening in Parliament), took various actions to eliminate the 
military’s power over politics. They successfully facilitated the discourse of settling accounts with military 
coups in a form of populism, particularly before the 2010 Referendum, which made way for the chief 
commander of the 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren, to face trial. Orhon (2013) highlights the growing 
public interest that paved the way for a more open discussion of the 1980 coup during the 2000s. The 
increasing number of books, articles, television programs, films, and documentaries about the coup 
“constitute a popular, though indirect, means for memory politics” (Orhon, 2013, p. 122) such as the 
serial My Heart Won’t Forget You (Bu Kalp Seni Unutur mu?, 2009–2010; see Figure 2), which depicted 
prison life and torture in the coup years. 
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Figure 2. The “political” period drama Remember Darling depicts the true story  
of 17-year-old Erdal Eren who was executed by the military government of  
the 1980 coup.  Erdal Eren is taken to gallows by the military officers.  




However, the infiltration of political history into television dramas existed before My Heart Won’t 
Forget You. Expansion of the television market led to the creation of expensive productions such as period 
dramas. In programs such as Rose Embroidery on My Hoop (Cemberimde Gul Oya, 2004–2005), political 
history served as a social background for the characters. They were portrayed as political activists, 
affiliated leftists or rightists, or at least as ordinary people who felt the impact of political conflicts in their 
personal lives. Remember Darling (Hatirla Sevgili, 2006–2008) situated the main characters within the 
political context of a long period running from the 1950s to the 1980s, as they suffer from falling in love 
with someone from an opposition political movement, being attacked or arrested because of their political 
views or activities, or being forced to take sides in a polarized political climate. The depiction of the 1960 
and 1980 military coups, which dramatically transforms the lives of the characters, is reiterated in other 
examples such as I Loved Him So Much (Ben Onu Cok Sevdim, 2013) and Autumn Roses (Guz Gulleri, 
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2010–2011). Remarkably, the representations and discourses of these dramas on politics, political 
identities, and military interventions are diverse and multifocal in terms of the ways in which they 
construct history, personalities, and characters. The trend of “settling accounts” with the past in television 
dramas usually addressed military coups as they have remained, as a result of possible pressures from the 




Saracoglu (2013) notes that the JDP’s ongoing negotiations with the Kurdish movement and its 
neoliberal and Islamist outlook obscure the party’s nationalist character, which only becomes visible in its 
foreign policies. According to Saracoglu, neo-Ottomanism could not be explicitly manifested by the 
government authorities due to their need for internal and external political stability; instead, it has been 
transferred to the field of ideologies via the unofficial institutions of academia and the media. Challenging 
the hegemony of Kemalism (and thus, indirectly, that of republicanism and secularism), the JDP adopted 
the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and presented itself as the successor to the Ottoman past. White 
(2002) describes neo-Ottomanism as “a widespread nostalgia for things Ottoman” (p. 30).  
 
Although neo-Ottomanism has been on the Turkish cultural agenda since the 1980s “combined 
with a version of laissez-faire Westernism” (Navaro-Yashin, 2002, p. 124), the contemporary neo-Ottoman 
revival owes a great deal to the JDP’s ambition to play a leading role in the Middle East and the way in 
which the party has re-invented the Ottoman origins in order to distinguish itself from Republicanism and 
“secular” Kemalism. As White (2013) notes, “Turkey’s Ottoman past, long ignored under the Kemalist 
regime, now romanticized and consumed uncritically, has become a touchstone for these desires” (p. 12). 
The cultural re-invention of Ottomanism has had a wide impact on several fields, including fashion, style, 
consumption, architecture, music, and popular culture.  
 
The television drama Magnificent Century (see Figure 3) depicts the 16th-century Ottoman court 
in which the wives of Suleiman the Magnificent compete in attracting the Sultan’s attention and fight over 
the succession for their children. Aside from some earlier examples such as Scrubbird (Calikusu, 1986) 
and Leaf Cast (Yaprak Dokumu, 1988), which draw on the dilemmas of Turkish modernization during the 
late Ottoman period of the 20th century as a background for the main characters, Magnificent Century can 
be addressed as the first drama that focuses on the life of the Ottoman dynasty. 
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Figure 3. Accession to the throne ceremony of Suleiman the Magnificient.  




 The serial’s success encouraged others such as Once upon a Time Ottoman: Rebellion (Bir 
Zamanlar Osmanli: Kiyam) in 2012 and Fatih in 2013. The impact of this neo-Ottomanism went beyond 
the Turkish context to reach Arab countries, thanks to the exportation of these programs. As well as the 
Ottoman series themselves, neo-Ottoman fantasies are also promoted via other exported dramas such as 
Valley of the Wolves and Noor (Buccianti, 2010; Kraidy & Al-Ghazzi, 2013). Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi argue 
(2013, p. 27, emphasis in original) that coverage of the dramas’ male protagonists “establishes them as 
cool neo-Ottomans more alluring and muscled versions of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan” for the Arab public. Notably, neo-Ottomanism is a way to culturally refer to Islam in response to 
the “secularist” emphasis of Kemalism. Walton (2010) suggests seeing neo-Ottomanism as a negotiation 
between broader public discourses and pious sensibilities. Furthermore, the Ottoman past shared by other 
countries facilitates imaginations concerning the ummah (Muslim society) as a single, unified entity. In 
this regard, the dramas of the neo-Ottoman trend also give an account of the notions of Islamic piety 
which have emerged in Turkish television fiction.7 
 
 
                                                 
7 In contradiction, however, conservative reactions against Turkish dramas emerged in many Arab 
countries (Kraidy & Al-Ghazzi, 2013; Mohamed, 2012) and Pakistan (Jawad, 2013), complaining that the 
programs represented a threat to Islamic values. 
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The Infiltration of Islamic Piety 
 
The issue of piety has, on Turkish television, mostly been limited to religious talk shows in which 
academics of Islamic theology talk about certain topics, tell parables, answer audience questions 
regarding everyday dilemmas in practicing Islam, interpret Koranic verses, etc. While religious talk shows 
have conventionally been launched on mainstream channels during Ramadan, in recent years piety has 
infiltrated television in forms other than Ramadan shows. Morning talk shows (so-called women’s 
programs), in which psychologists, GPs, and solicitors are questioned about the topic of the day and the 
problems of the invited guests or studio audience, began to include Islamic theologians among the 
permanent staff of the programs alongside other professionals. Adaklı (2009) highlights how Turkish 
television has experienced an increase in the number of pious themes and representations of symbolic 
elites of Islamic communities, rather than an increase in the number of specifically pious programs. 
Ferjani (2010), in relation to Arab satellite television, also describes a process in which “traditional 
preaching coexists with new forms more in tune with commercialized Islam” (p. 91). 
  
Rather than specific programs devoted to religious topics, piety has recently been incorporated 
into the content of other programs and genres. Isik (2013) argues that parables told by characters in 
dramas such as Valley of the Wolves and Crazy Heart (Deli Yurek, 1998–2002) operate as rhetorical 
strategies for moralized teaching and a culture of piety. Whenever the protagonist gets into trouble, a 
wise male character addresses the paradoxes and problems of the situation through parables, indicating 
the solution with reference to Islam. The father of the protagonist in Valley of the Wolves and a friend of 
the protagonist in Crazy Heart grant the main characters peace of mind by means of parables, while 
visiting mosques and listening to ezan (the call to prayer) are seen as ways to ensure spiritual purification. 
  
 
Figure 4. Zeliha and Bilal walking in public. Peace Street, episode 47. 
2474 Kumru Berfin Emre Cetin International Journal of Communication 8(2014) 
It is also worth noting that until recently the veil was regarded as an indicator of Islamism and 
excluded from television. For instance, despite the fact that Valley of the Wolves heavily featured daily 
Islamic practices and the promotion of religion as a moral source, one of the main characters, the mother 
of the protagonist Nazife, appears unveiled. This would be highly unlikely for a wife whose husband holds 
a religious post such as that of muezzin (male singer of ezan). The portrayal of Nazife was bound by the 
secular conventions of Turkish television in which veiling had been taboo. Eventually, the drama Peace 
Street (Huzur Sokagi, 2012–; see Figure 4), adapted from the novel by Sule Yuksel Senler that widely 
inspired Islamist youth of the period, introduced the first veiled main character on mainstream television 
(Emre Cetin, 2013). Although veiled and religiously pious characters were a daily occurrence on Islamic 
television channels for more than 20 years, mainstream television broadcasting abstained from such 
controversial representations that supposedly challenged the entertainment element of dramas. While 
Peace Street broke the long-lived taboo of showing veiling, visual representations of a culture of piety 
through characters praying, religious verbal references (for example, Allah willing, thanks to Allah, Allah 
saving, etc.), or the wearing of the veil varied in the show’s successors. The increasing appearance of 
piety and an Islamic worldview in television dramas redefined the boundaries between secular and 
religious for the television medium, as well as implying their mainstreaming, which had previously been 
ghettoized into the so-called pious television channels such as TGRT, Kanal 7, and Samanyolu.  
 
Thus, in a highly politicized media environment characterized by polarization, whether intentional 
or not, television dramas that previously had avoided meddling in serious issues began to suggest ways of 
understanding the current political situation as well as the near and far past of Turkey and religion. The 
politicization of dramas, therefore, has not been a one-way process. While political institutions and 
agencies “discovered” the political significance of dramas both in Turkey and abroad, television dramas 
themselves welcomed the penetration of political topics and controversies into their content in a politicized 
media environment. That is not, however, to deny the role of direct political intervention. 
 
Political Interventions in Television Dramas: Screen Wars 
 
The number of debates on the content of television dramas (for example, their representations 
and characters) has increased remarkably over the last decade. One could also argue that dramas had 
never previously featured so frequently in political and parliamentary speeches. Politicians and members 
of Parliament and the cabinet have frequently raised concerns about various aspects of dramas such as 
Valley of the Wolves and Magnificent Century including violence, protection of the family, and 
representation of the past. The Turkish regulatory body, RTSC, has implemented penal sanctions against 
television dramas, including warnings and fines. In this regard, I discuss political interventions in 
television dramas in two respects: (1) speeches and legal cases by political actors and (2) regulations of 
the RTSC, members of which are elected by MPs in accordance with the number of seats they occupy in 
the Parliament (Adaklı, 2009). Although varying examples of these interventions exist, I focus on two 
cases—Valley of the Wolves (henceforth, VoW) and Magnificent Century (henceforth, MC)—that epitomize 
the ways in which these political interventions take place.  
 
Former cabinet minister Faruk Celik criticized the male audience who preferred to watch VoW 
during the traditional times of prayer on Thursday nights. He was shocked to hear that in one small town 
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in southeast Turkey, even the Imam who led the worship did not attend prayers on Thursday nights. The 
drama’s popularity, which had such a hold over the audience that they ignored their routine prayers, 
concerned the minister, who felt that the serial represented to some viewers an alternative to pious 
practice. On the other hand, the parliamentary branch of the Kurdish movement, The Peace and 
Democracy Party, submitted a complaint to the RTSC in 2010 accusing four dramas (including VoW and 
One Turkey) of being unrealistic and anti-Kurdish, promoting hostility, and harming the culture of 
brotherhood. While One Turkey was fined and warned against “promoting violence and provoking senses 
of racist hate,” VoW received more than five penalties for “promoting and banalizing violence” and 
“containing content harmful to the physical, mental and moral development of youth and children and 
broadcasting it without protective symbols” (Ozkalipci, 2013, para. 3).  
 
The last version, VoW: Terror, triggered a series of oppositional responses among the public. The 
first groups who felt uncomfortable about the program were the Kurds and some leftist groups willing to 
resolve the Kurdish question through democratic means and negotiations. At the opposite end of the 
political spectrum, Turkish nationalists, who view the Kurdish question as a rebellion against the state 
which must be dealt with by military means, were inclined to silence any public discussion of the issue and 
were concerned by the increasing visibility of Kurds in the media. Aside from the pro-state talk shows and 
propaganda docu-dramas of public broadcasting, VoW: Terror presented the most explicit fictional 
reference to the Kurdish question in the Turkish media. Hence, as the first attempt to approach the 
Kurdish question from an unofficial, yet nationalistic perspective, the serial caused confusion and anxiety 
among the public, resulting in indirect censorship.  
 
Many people telephoned in complaints to the regulatory body, the RTSC, after seeing the trailer—
even before the first episode was broadcast. According to the former head of the RTSC, Zahid Akman, 
more than 10,000 people complained about VoW: Terror, with another 2,000 phone calls supporting the 
serial (Milliyet, 2007). After the first episode was aired, the RTSC invited channel executives in to discuss 
the series’ future. Eventually, VoW: Terror was cancelled by the television channel, Show TV, as it could 
not resist the pressure from the public and the regulatory body. However, Show TV decided to advertise 
the telephone number of the RTSC when the first episode was on the air, hoping that VoW supporters 
would have an impact on the council. The countercampaign to defend the serial continued online in fan 
forums and in surveys conducted by two leading newspapers, Hurriyet and Milliyet. Hurriyet celebrated 
receiving more than one million responses to its survey, which it claimed was a “record for the digital 
democracy” (Cekirge, 2007, [title]). Of the respondents, 88.1% found the decision to cancel the series 
wrong and labeled it censorship. Mr. Akman commented, however, that if Show TV had insisted on 
screening the program, the council would have banned the channel from broadcasting for one month, in 
accordance with the fourth article of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Law (Sazak, 2007). As it was, 
Mr. Akman sent a thank-you note to the channel executives for agreeing to cancel the serial.  
 
The production company, Pana Film, protested at this de facto censorship in a press release and 
a couple of months later produced another version of the serial in response. Some of the nationalist 
associations established to represent the families of “martyrs,” that is, those families whose members had 
been killed in armed conflict between Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish Army, such as the Erzurum Martyr 
Families Aid & Solidarity Association and the Cubuk Terror Victims Aid & Solidarity Association, also 
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declared their objection to the censorship of VoW: Terror. This was followed by many conspiracy theories 
about the cancellation circulating on fan websites (Hurriyet, 2007b; Ipek, 2007). On the other hand, in 
Diyarbakir, known as the capital of Turkish Kurdistan, the Tourism Advertisement Association warned the 
production crew that “we are going to sue the crew, if the name of our town is mentioned in Valley of the 
Wolves: Terror” (Hurriyet, 2007a). In October 2007, Show TV and Pana Film agreed to show the second 
episode of the serial as a one-off television show, promising to donate the advertising revenue to the 
“martyr” families and the Mehmetcik Trust, which was established by the Turkish military to support 
martyr families, veterans, and disabled soldiers. It is also worth mentioning that VoW: Terror was 
produced during a period when the government officially declared the start of the “Kurdish Initiative,” 
(2009), which was presented as the initial step in the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question. It 
was speculated that the serial was supported by the government as part of this initiative. However, 
manufacturing public opinion via VoW: Terror failed due to the unexpected controversial public response. 
Furthermore, the RTSC’s enforcement implicitly invited, if not provoked concerned groups in society to 
take sides regarding the program.  
 
Much like VoW, MC provoked a response before it was broadcast, but this time from nationalist-
conservative groups. The RTSC received thousands of messages from viewers, while politicians and 
historians drew the attention of the public and producers to the “delicacy” of the topic (Tekelioglu, 2012). 
Deputy Prime MinisterArinc stated that he felt sorry that in the trailers, the Magnificent Suleiman was 
shown enjoying his harem and alcohol. He emphasized that the broadcasting bill allowed no “preventive 
precautions,” but that he would immediately consider complaints and implement legal sanctions when the 
show was broadcast (“Muthesem Yuzyil” Arinc`i Kizdirdi, 2011, para. 5). The RTSC imposed a warning and 
penalty on Show TV soon after the drama was aired on the basis that the program “was not sufficiently 
sensitive about the privacy of a historically significant personality” (“Muthesem Yuzyil” Arinc`i Kizdirdi, 
2011, para. 4). After a few episodes, the serial was condemned by the youth organization of the Islamic 
Felicity Party, as well as the nationalist Great Union Party, with a press release read alongside songs of a 
Janissary Band. Members of the organization criticized MC, inviting the government to “claim our history” 
in response to a television show which “humiliates our glorious history” (Yener, 2011, para. 1). The group 
also attacked billboards, destroying the posters advertising the serial. Interestingly, the drama’s writers 
took notice of audience responses and revised the plot and characters, particularly Suleiman, the Sultan’s 
scenes with the harem being counterbalanced by scenes of his conquests and war speeches and his 
depiction as a ruler.  
 
Nevertheless, reactions against the drama were pursued by other politicians. In late 2012 MP 
Oktay Saral explained that he had prepared a bill proposing the cancellation of MC (Radikal, 2012). Mr. 
Saral also mentioned that he had lobbied for the bill and gained the support of the Nationalist Movement 
Party, although Parliament never voted on the proposal. Prime Minister Erdogan also criticized MC several 
times:  
 
We would go wherever our ancestors went on their horses. We would be interested in 
everywhere. However, I suppose, they know our ancestors on the television screen such 
as in the documentary, Magnificent Century. We don’t have such ancestors. We don’t 
know such a Magnificent Kanuni [Lawgiver]. We don’t know such a Sultan Suleiman. He 
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spent 30 years on his horse, not in the court as you watch on the drama. We must know 
it very well, understand it very well. I condemn the directors of those dramas and 
owners of television channels before our nation. Despite the fact that we warned whom 
it may concern … I wait for the courts to make the relevant decision. There shouldn’t be 
such an understanding … The lesson should be given within the law by the nation for 
those who ridicule the values of this nation. (Hurriyet, 2012) 
 
Following the Prime Minister’s statement, Turkish Airlines removed MC from its in-flight 
entertainment system. Aydos (2013) argues that the discontent surrounding MC arose due to the 
representations of sexual relations within the court and harem life. In addition to its moral concerns, the 
government regarded the program’s representation of the Sultan as an insult to the Turkish nation and 
invited the RTSC to take action against the drama, while implicitly threatening producers and channel 
owners. The popular forms of the neo-Ottoman trend in TV dramas trigger anxiety and concern for those 
in power as they promote “entertaining” versions of Ottoman nostalgia. As such, in the case of VoW, the 
government attempted to silence multiple voices and regimes of representation regarding topics which 
overlapped with their political agenda. Even the trailers triggered reactions against these dramas and 
increased the tension between the fields of popular culture and politics as the government employed the 
RTSC as a means of direct control and censorship. Furthermore, such an attitude encouraged individual 
reactions, as in the case of Mr. Arinc, who clearly indicated that the government would take complaints 
about MC seriously; or following the Prime Minister’s statement, a tourism professional in Konya who 
submitted a denunciation of the drama to the prosecutor, complaining that “Magnificent Century 
humiliates our historical values” (Milliyet, 2012); while an Azerbaijani dentist living in Turkey denounced 
the serial, claiming that the “Safevid state is shown as Iranian despite being Turkish and Alevi” (Dogan, 
2013).  
 
The Ottoman drama Once upon a Time Ottoman: Rebellion (2012) launched by the public 
broadcasting service TRT was regarded as a counterrepresentation that would compensate for the 
discomfort caused by MC. However, neither Once upon a Time Ottoman nor Fatih were able to compete 




One could argue that the relationship between freedom of the press on the one hand and 
television entertainment on the other has been ignored in television studies. The politics of entertainment 
are usually understood with regard to discourse and ideology: various ideas and messages packed around 
issues of gender, ethnicity, class, and other social identities. On the other hand, the politicization of 
dramas has usually been framed by concepts of “nation building” (Abu-Lughod, 2005; Mankekar, 1999), 
propaganda, or censorship, which do not necessarily help us elucidate the complexities of politics and 
television entertainment in different cultural contexts. I would argue that increasing political interventions 
into the content of television dramas, along with the infiltration of political topics, ideas, and issues into 
dramas, is an indication of the vulnerability of press freedom. In this sense, politicization does not imply a 
process by which different ideas are able to address each other in an open environment, but rather, in the 
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Turkish context, the politicization of television dramas is characterized by pressures, interventions, and 
encounters in which the less powerful side is silenced.  
 
Turkish television has experienced a peculiar period since the early 2000s in which new 
regulations, rapid market growth, and political pressures interact with and transform each other. As 
Turkey in 2013 sets new records for the highest number of journalists arrested, television dramas suffer 
from their fair share of political pressures, while the contemporary political agenda has, in turn, infiltrated 
the content of those dramas. The gradual transformation of political speeches about dramas from 
complaints about themes and representations to verbal attacks has had various consequences for the 
dramas, from cancellation to autocensorship. During the first period of the JDP government, the contest 
over television content was realized by various actors, however, the second decade has been determined 
by the government’s overwhelming hegemony over television, as the speeches of politicians and the 
penalties given by the RTSC indicate. Recent attempts to shape and determine media content also have 
transnational counterparts. The public institutions such as the Office of the Prime Minister and the 
Directorate General of Press and Information organize joint events and conferences, and launch 
collaborative programs with leading Arab media producers and journalists who have been enthusiastic 
about the popularity of Turkish dramas in the Middle East. Nevertheless, to reveal particular mechanisms 
of government control, further studies investigating television production, decision-making processes, and 
relations between media and political elites are necessary. Ethnographies with program producers can 
contribute a great deal to understanding the shadowy nexus of freedom of the press and television 
entertainment.  
 
Dialectically, the politicization of dramas has allowed alternative voices to flourish in a variety of 
productions that brought social issues to the agenda. Dramas such as My Heart Won’t Forget You, Behzat 
C. (2010–2013), and Lost City (Kayip Sehir, 2012–2013) suggested critical understandings of various 
social issues including military coups, the murder of women, crime, and migration, while giving voice to 
underrepresented, marginalized groups. On the other hand, the decreasing audience interest in dramas 
such as I Loved Him So Much, which are characterized by preaching protagonists with long political 
manifestos, indicate that explicit politicization may be unpopular and, hence, not long-lasting 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider the politicizing process of television dramas in a positive way that 
has contributed to the making of a multivocal television culture. Instead, the intervention of politicians 
and public institutions, as well as reactive audience responses, indicates the shrinking borders of press 
freedom that encroach on the television entertainment market, particularly with regard to dramas in the 
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